Realistic rationalism
Jerrold J. Katz
In Realistic Rationalism, Jerrold Katz develops a new philosophical position integrating realism and rationalism. Realism here means that the objects of study in mathematics and other formal sciences are abstract; rationalism means that our knowledge of them is not empirical. Katz uses this position to meet the principal challenges to realism. In exposing the flaws in criticisms of the antirealists, he shows that realists can explain knowledge of abstract objects without supposing we have causal contact with them, that numbers are determinate objects, and that the standard counterexamples to the abstract/concrete distinction have no force. He develops a rationalist and non-naturalist account of philosophical knowledge and argues that it is preferable to contemporary naturalist and empiricist accounts.
Tahun:
2000
Penerbit:
The MIT Press
Bahasa:
english
Halaman:
247
ISBN 10:
0262611511
ISBN 13:
9780262611510
Nama siri:
Representation and Mind
Fail:
PDF, 1.33 MB
IPFS:
,
english, 2000
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